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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 More than twenty years ago, Joseph Wallace 
pleaded guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) to third-degree 
murder and related crimes.  This appeal concerns his 






January 7, 2002, but which he did not file until 
September 13, 2015.  He asks us now to excuse his 
decade-plus delay in filing the petition.   
For much of his life, if not all of it, Wallace has 
suffered from severe mental illness, including bipolar 
disorder with psychotic features, chronic depression, 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and major 
affective disorder; his illness has manifested at times as 
hallucinations, religious delusions, manic activity, and 
suicidal tendencies.  It is undisputed that an acute 
psychotic episode led him to commit the crime for which 
he remains incarcerated today.  Wallace contends that his 
mental illness so hampered his ability to think clearly that 
he could not reasonably have been expected to file for 
federal habeas relief at any time prior to September 2015.  
But after a painstaking review of the record, we cannot 
agree.  Instead, we conclude that Wallace has not 
demonstrated his entitlement to equitable tolling that 
would allow us to extend the filing deadline for the 
duration of the period of excessive delay the record 
reveals.   
In addition, Wallace claims that his prescribed use 
of the prescription drug Ritalin1 may have exacerbated his 
 
1 Ritalin is the brand name for methylphenidate 






psychosis, rendering him involuntarily intoxicated or 
legally insane at the time of his crime such that he could 
not form the mens rea necessary for murder.  But given the 
applicable law and the evidence of record, we are not 
persuaded that this claim permits Wallace to employ the 
narrow “actual innocence gateway,” McQuiggin v. 
Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013), to excuse him from the 
filing deadline for habeas petitions set forth in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244.   
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment 
dismissing Wallace’s habeas petition as untimely. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2  
  On February 28, 2000, Wallace was in the throes of 
a severe psychotic episode.  Early that morning, after a 
sleepless night, he got into bed with his wife, Eileen.  
Wallace was clutching a knife.  After waiting ten or fifteen 
 
used to treat Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) and narcolepsy.  JA 327–28.   
2 The factual background and procedural history have been 
drawn from the contents of the appendix provided by the 
parties.  The salient facts are largely undisputed.  
However, portions of the record appear to be missing or 
incomplete, likely due to the lengthy interval between 







minutes to build up his courage, Wallace used the knife to 
stab Eileen in the chest as she lay sleeping.  She awoke, 
pleaded with him to stop, and tried to fight him off.  They 
struggled for a few minutes while Wallace continued to 
stab and slash at her.  Eileen soon died from her wounds.   
 Wallace then showered, changed his clothes, 
stowed the knife in a drawer, and locked the door to their 
house, leaving Eileen’s body behind.  Then he left for a 
convenience store.  Later, Wallace took a train to 
Philadelphia where he planned to commit suicide.  Police 
were waiting for him, however, after his mother disclosed 
his whereabouts.  They apprehended him in Philadelphia’s 
Thirtieth Street train station.   
 Meanwhile, Patricia Daniels, began to worry when 
her friend, Eileen, missed a scheduled appointment.  
Daniels contacted the police and asked for a “well-being 
check” at the Wallaces’ home.  JA 1150.3  A responding 
officer discovered the doors were locked, and when no one 
answered, he entered forcefully by breaking a 
windowpane.  Daniels accompanied the officer inside 
where they discovered Eileen’s body upstairs.   
  The next day, while in police custody, Wallace 
admitted to stabbing his wife to death.  He told police that 
he had acted on a belief that Eileen’s death would put her 
 






out of her misery and set her spirit free.  As he related his 
account, he appeared mild, calm, and subdued to the 
officers who interviewed him.     
  Several months later, Wallace explained to a doctor 
that he had killed Eileen because he had believed that he 
and she, together, “were Jesus,” JA 253, and that “he was 
doing her a favor by killing her” because “she is in 
heaven” and “it was the right thing for her,” JA 256.  He 
then explained that he left the scene because he knew the 
police would be looking for him.   
  Around the time of the crime, Wallace had been 
taking prescription medications including Ambien, Paxil, 
and Ritalin.  Later, he claimed to doctors that he did not 
remember precisely which medications he took on the day 
of Eileen’s death.   
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  Wallace’s Pennsylvania Criminal Proceeding 
 
  Wallace was charged in the Court of Common Pleas 
of Chester County with first-, second-, and third-degree 
murder, 18 Pa C.S. § 2502,4 aggravated assault, 18 Pa. C.S. 
 
4 Under 18 Pa C.S. § 2502(a), first-degree murder is a 
criminal homicide “committed by an intentional killing.”  






§ 2702(a)(1), (4), possession of an instrument of crime, 18 
Pa. C.S. § 907(a), and tampering with evidence, 18 Pa. 
C.S. § 4910(1).5  The case was assigned to Judge James P. 
MacElree, III.  First Assistant Public Defender Graham 
Andes, Esq., represented Wallace.  At that time, Andes 
was a twenty-seven-year veteran of the Chester County 
public defender’s office and was that office’s specialist in 
mental health defenses.  Andes was assisted by co-counsel 
Maria Heller, Esq.   
  In March 2000, Andes directed two forensic 
psychologists, Dr. Gerald Cooke and Dr. Robert Sadoff, to 
examine Wallace and opine on his mental competence.  
Both doctors concluded that Wallace was competent to 
attend a preliminary hearing but that he would need to be 
re-evaluated as to his competence to stand trial.   
  In June 2000, Andes requested Drs. Sadoff and 
Cooke to re-evaluate Wallace by conducting 
 
lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate 
and premeditated killing.” § 2502(d).  Second degree 
murder is a criminal homicide “committed while 
defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in 
the perpetration of a felony.” § 2502(b).  Third degree 
murder is “[a]ll other kinds of murder.”  § 2502(c).  
5 The tampering charge arose from Wallace’s having 






psychological testing and reviewing his medical records.  
Andes sought comprehensive written opinions assessing 
both Wallace’s competence to stand trial and his state of 
mind at the time of the crime.  In response, Dr. Cooke 
reported that Wallace was, at the time of the evaluation, in 
partial remission due to his medication regime.  Dr. Cooke 
adjudged him “marginally competent to stand trial,” but 
suggested re-evaluation “a day or two prior to” trial to 
assess whether the stress of an approaching trial could 
cause him to decompensate.  JA 999.  As to state of mind 
at the time of the crime, Dr. Cooke opined that Wallace 
was not legally insane but satisfied Pennsylvania’s GBMI6 
definition: 
Wallace was overtly and grossly psychotic at 
the time of the offense, and . . . his actions 
followed from a psychotic delusion.  If not 
for his psychosis, it is my opinion that this 
offense would not have occurred.  It is also 
 
6 “A person who timely offers a defense of insanity in 
accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure may be 
found ‘guilty but mentally ill’ [GBMI] at trial if the trier 
of facts finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person 
is guilty of an offense, was mentally ill at the time of the 
commission of the offense and was not legally insane at 







my opinion that because of his psychosis he 
could not conform his behavior to the 
requirements of law and therefore he 
would meet the criteria for Guilty but 
Mentally Ill.  However, though he believed 
that he was acting based on a higher law, he 
did know that by Man’s law what he did 
would be viewed as wrong, and that the 
police would come looking for him.  
Therefore, it is my opinion that he does not 
meet the stricter M’Naughten standard for 
Insanity. . . .  [I]t is my opinion that Mr. 
Wallace acted without malice.  Rather, 
based on his delusions, he felt he was freeing 
his wife from an evil world and sending her 
to heaven.   
JA 1000 (emphases added).  
  Dr. Sadoff reached essentially the same conclusions 
as had Dr. Cooke.  Sadoff opined in a June 2000 report 
that Wallace was “currently mentally competent to 
proceed.”  JA 983.  In addition, Sadoff concluded that 
Wallace stabbed his wife “with a benevolent intent and 
without malice, i.e., without the intent to harm her, but 
rather to help her get out of the misery of this world.”  JA 
982.  But Dr. Sadoff went on to opine that Wallace was 






Mr. Wallace knew that he was stabbing his 
wife and knew that it was against the law.  
His behavior indicates that he wanted to 
avoid the police and knew that taking 
another’s life was against the law.  Thus, 
he does not fit the McNaughten rule for 
insanity in Pennsylvania.  With respect to 
diminished capacity, Mr. Wallace had the 
ability to form the intent to kill his wife, 
which is what he intended to do, and 
carried out his intention, so there is no 
diminished capacity.  However, Mr. 
Wallace, in my opinion, lacked substantial 
capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law, which is one of the 
definitions for mentally ill in the legal 
concept of “guilty but mentally ill.”     
JA 982–83 (emphases added). 
  On June 7, 2000, the trial court held a status hearing 
during which Andes indicated that the doctors had found 
Wallace competent to proceed, and Wallace himself 
agreed with their assessment.7  In an abundance of caution, 
 
7 Andes disclosed to the trial court that Wallace had 
requested the death penalty for himself (despite the fact 






the trial court conducted a second arraignment to ensure 
that there was no question of Wallace being competent for 
the arraignment process.  While Wallace stood mute, 
Andes entered a plea of not guilty on his client’s behalf as 
to all counts.  Trial was tentatively set for late September 
2000.   
 In the fall of 2000, Andes moved to recuse Judge 
MacElree as trial judge, arguing that the Judge had 
displayed an appearance of bias against mental health 
defenses based on statements made in Wallace’s case.  On 
September 26, 2000, oral argument on the recusal motion 
was held before Senior Judge John Backenstoe of Lehigh 
County.  Andes argued that “there is no defense in this case 
but a mental health defense” but observed that, “based on 
the psychological/psychiatric reports that [he had] 
received from [the] experts, there [was] almost no chance 
of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity.”  JA 1057.  
Thus, he anticipated that the case before the jury would 
focus on GBMI.  Andes also observed that there was little 
record evidence to support a finding of malice, apart from 
the inference that would arise from the use of a deadly 
weapon to a vital part of the victim’s body.  JA 1059.  
 
penalty) and that the doctors had considered that fact when 






Judge Backenstoe ultimately denied the disqualification 
motion and the matter continued before Judge MacElree.   
 On November 9, 2000, Judge MacElree conducted 
an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress.  Andes 
reiterated at that time that he planned to present both the 
insanity and GBMI defenses.  He stated, “[w]e have taken 
the position that even though our doctors do not indicate 
that [Wallace] was M’Naughten insane, that this should be 
presented to a jury.”  JA 1232.  Andes noted that the 
Commonwealth’s doctors were still examining Wallace 
and had yet to determine whether they viewed him as 
insane.  Trial was re-scheduled to mid-December.  
Later that November, the Commonwealth’s expert, 
psychiatrist Timothy J. Michals, examined Wallace, 
conducted psychological testing, and reviewed his 
medical records.8  Dr. Michals concluded that Wallace 
was competent to proceed to trial.  He further concluded 
that, in killing Eileen, Wallace had acted with malice as 
defined under Pennsylvania law: 
 
8 Dr. Michals’s report indicates that forensic psychologist 
Dr. Steven Samuel also examined Wallace and prepared a 
report.  The record reflects that a transcript was prepared 
of the examination that Drs. Samuel and Michals 
conducted.  Neither Samuel’s report nor the examination 






[I]t is my opinion that Mr. Wallace knew that 
the stabbing and other injuries that he had 
inflicted on his wife were wrong and would 
cause her physical death. 
It is my understanding that malice is 
defined as, “. . . first, an intention to kill, or 
second, an intent to inflict serious bodily 
harm, or third, (a wickedness of 
disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, 
recklessness of consequences, and a mind 
regardless of social duty indicating an 
unjustified disregard for the probability of 
death or great bodily harm and an extreme 
indifference to the value of human life) (a 
conscious disregard of an unjustified and 
extremely high risk that his actions might 
cause death or serious bodily harm).[”]  
It is my opinion that Mr. Wallace’s killing 
of his wife was done with malice.  Secondly, 
it is my opinion that he intended to inflict 
serious bodily harm.  Thirdly, it is my 
opinion, based on the review of the autopsy 
and the photographs of Mrs. Wallace, that 
Mr. Wallace acted with wickedness of 






recklessness in taking his wife’s life and this 
was not a benevolent killing. 
JA 1448 (emphases added).   
At around the same time as Dr. Michals’s 
examination, defense counsel asked Drs. Cooke and 
Sadoff to revisit their views on Wallace’s state of mind.  
Dr. Sadoff reiterated that his opinion had not changed 
since the June 2000 evaluation.  Dr. Cooke similarly 
restated his earlier opinion “that the actions that comprised 
the offense would not have occurred but for Mr. Wallace’s 
grandiose psychotic delusions, and that because he acted 
out these delusions believing that what he was doing was 
out of love and right in the eyes of God, he acted without 
malice.”  JA 312.  
  After months of trial preparations, on December 6, 
2000, Wallace entered a plea agreement with the 
Commonwealth.  He pleaded GBMI to third-degree 
murder, possession of an instrument of crime, and 
tampering with evidence.9  Judge MacElree sentenced 
Wallace to a term of 23½ to 47 years’ imprisonment.   
 
9 Due to the long lapse of time between Wallace’s guilty 
plea and initiation of post-conviction proceedings, the tape 






  Wallace did not take a direct appeal. 
B.  Wallace’s Pennsylvania PCRA Proceeding 
 
  In the fall of 2012, Wallace spoke to a prison doctor 
who expressed a suspicion that Wallace may have been 
legally insane at the time of the murder.  Wallace’s 
treatment team began encouraging him to pursue legal 
remedies, and they put him in touch with a fellow inmate 
who could assist him with legal filings.  With that 
assistance, on September 3, 2013—nearly a decade and a 
half after he entered his guilty plea—Wallace filed a pro 
se petition for post-conviction relief under Pennsylvania’s 
Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).  In it, Wallace 
proposed a new theory to explain his violent actions in 
February of 2000: that consuming Ritalin may have 
caused the psychotic episode that led him to kill Eileen.  
He also raised a number of related claims, including actual 
innocence based on insanity and involuntary intoxication 
caused by Ritalin and ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failing to adequately investigate the Ritalin theory or a 
legal insanity defense.   
  The PCRA Court appointed Robert P. Brendza, 
Esq., to represent Wallace.  On October 31, 2013, Brendza 
 
the plea hearing had been destroyed.  Accordingly, no plea 






filed a no-merit letter and moved to withdraw from the 
representation on grounds that Wallace’s PCRA petition 
was untimely filed.  See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(1) 
(providing that a PCRA petition is due one year after the 
date the judgment becomes final).  On September 24, 
2014, the PCRA Court agreed.  The PCRA Court rejected 
Wallace’s claim that the petition’s untimeliness should be 
excused based upon “newly discovered facts” under 42 Pa. 
C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (requiring that the facts upon which 
the petition is based “were unknown to the petitioner and 
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due 
diligence”).  The court observed that “[t]he ‘new facts’ 
asserted by defendant, including his claim of involuntary 
intoxication by prescription medication, were not new, 
rather they were different iterations of an old issue, 
defendant’s mental health at the time he killed his wife.”  
JA 71 n.1.  The PCRA Court therefore dismissed the 
petition as untimely and granted counsel’s motion to 
withdraw.   
 Wallace appealed.  On November 25, 2014, the 
Superior Court affirmed the PCRA Court’s dismissal.  The 
Superior Court agreed with the PCRA Court that 
Wallace’s Ritalin-related claims “are not [based on] newly 
discovered facts but merely a newly willing source for 
previously known facts.”  JA 79 (citation omitted, cleaned 






On July 29, 2015, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
denied Wallace’s petition for allowance of appeal.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 119 A.3d 351 (Pa. 2015). 
C.  Wallace’s Federal Habeas Proceeding 
 On September 29, 2015, Wallace filed a pro se 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254.  In it, he raised claims similar to those raised in his 
2013 PCRA petition, including: actual innocence due to 
insanity and involuntary intoxication based on Ritalin use; 
incompetence to plead guilty; and ineffective assistance of 
counsel for advising him to plead guilty in light of his 
possible defenses.  The petition included a lengthy 
statement on timeliness, discussing Wallace’s long history 
of mental illness as well as purportedly recently 
discovered facts concerning Wallace’s lack of malice at 
the time of the offense and the potential side effects of 
Ritalin.  At Wallace’s request, the District Court appointed 
counsel from the Federal Community Defender Office.   
 In November 2017, Magistrate Judge Marilyn 
Heffley issued a detailed Report & Recommendation 
(R&R) addressing Wallace’s habeas claims.  In the R&R, 
she observed that, because Wallace did not appeal, his 
deadline to file a habeas petition was January 7, 2002.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). She further concluded that neither 
statutory nor equitable tolling applied to extend the 






 As to equitable tolling, Magistrate Judge Heffley 
concluded that Wallace failed to establish that 
extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a 
petition throughout the entire period of delay.  She noted 
that Drs. Cooke and Sadoff had opined that Wallace was 
not legally insane at the time of the crime and that he was 
competent to stand trial.  She concluded that Wallace 
failed to meet his burden to show that his mental illness 
prevented him from pursuing his legal rights during the 
statute of limitations period or for the subsequent 13 years.  
Notably, Magistrate Judge Heffley found that Wallace’s 
bipolar disorder was in full remission for several years 
beginning in December 2007.  In addition, even if his 
“marked recovery” leading to the ability to file in court did 
not begin until March 2013 (as he alleged), he did not file 
a federal habeas petition for another two and a half years.  
JA 731 n.4.  She went on to conclude that Wallace did not 
pursue his claim with reasonable diligence; for more than 
two years, he pursued a PCRA petition rather than federal 
relief.  Accordingly, she recommended that the habeas 
petition be denied. 
  In response to the R&R, Wallace’s counsel moved 
to withdraw from further representation.  Magistrate Judge 
Heffley issued a show cause order directing Wallace to 
demonstrate why the withdrawal request should not be 
granted.  Wallace moved for appointment of standby 






expert.  Wallace then filed a lengthy set of objections to 
the R&R accompanied by voluminous exhibits.  On 
August 8, 2018, District Judge Jeffrey Schmehl approved 
and adopted the R&R, dismissed Wallace’s petition, 
granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and denied the 
motion for expert funds as moot.   
  Wallace timely filed a pro se notice of appeal and 
applied for a certificate of appealability (COA).  A panel 
of this Court appointed counsel and granted a COA on the 
following issues relevant to the petition’s timeliness:  
(1) Whether Wallace is entitled to equitable tolling; 
(2) Whether the District Court should have addressed 
Wallace’s claim of innocence by reason of insanity 
or involuntary intoxication as a ground to excuse 
compliance with the statute of limitations under the 
equitable exception established by McQuiggin v. 
Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013); and 
(3) Whether the District Court should have addressed 
the merits of the motion for funds for an expert 
instead of dismissing it as moot.10 
 
10 Additionally, the panel granted the COA on: (1) whether 
Wallace is innocent of murder by reason of insanity or 






We address the issues in turn. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.   
We conduct a plenary review of the District Court’s 
order dismissing a habeas petition as time-barred.11  
 
to plead guilty; and (3) whether his counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by advising him to plead guilty 
without (a) ensuring his competence and (b) properly 
investigating insanity and involuntary intoxication 
defenses.  Our disposition on timeliness makes it 
unnecessary for us to reach these additional issues. 
11 In a non-precedential opinion, a panel of this Court 
observed that “it does not appear that we have definitively 
decided the standard of review applicable to the question 
of equitable tolling where there is a dispute concerning the 
petitioner’s mental competence.”  Champney v. Sec’y 
DOC, 469 F. App’x 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2012).  To the extent 
Champney identified an open question, we conclude that 
de novo review applies.  First, de novo review applies 
generally to a timeliness decision in a habeas case, see 
Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 2004), and 
Wallace offers no reason to apply a different standard 






Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 2004).  In the 
context of an actual innocence claim, we also conduct a 
plenary review of whether a petitioner’s evidence is 
sufficient to meet the standard set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 
513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995).  Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 
308, 337–38 (3d Cir. 2012).   
We review a District Court’s decision not to hold an 
evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.  See Morris v. 
Beard, 633 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2011).  We apply that 
same standard of review to the denial of discovery and the 
motion for expert witness funds.12  See Han Tak Lee v. 
Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 404 (3d Cir. 2012).  A District Court 
abuses its discretion when the requested discovery is 
 
a hearing, it was in no better position than we are to review 
the documentary evidence.  Accordingly, a more 
deferential standard of review is not warranted. 
12 Discovery in a habeas proceeding is permitted under 
Rule 6 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, which 
provides that “[a] judge may, for good cause, authorize a 
party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and may limit the extent of discovery.”  
To satisfy the “good cause” standard, a petitioner must set 
forth specific factual allegations which, if fully developed, 
would show entitlement to the writ.  See Williams v. 






essential for the habeas petitioner to develop fully his 
underlying claim.  Id.   
IV. EQUITABLE TOLLING 
A habeas petition under § 2254 must be filed within 
one year of, inter alia, “the date on which the judgment 
became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 
expiration of the time for seeking such review.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1)(A).13 
 
  Because Wallace did not appeal, the judgment 
became final thirty days after his sentence was imposed, 
on January 5, 2001.  See Pa. R. App. P. 903(c)(3).  Thus, 
under § 2244(d)(1)(A), his petition was due one year later, 
by January 7, 2002.14  But Wallace did not file until 
September 29, 2015.  Although Wallace did not file his 
habeas petition within the one-year period, he argues that 
he is entitled to equitable tolling of the approximately 
 
13 The remaining provisions of § 2244(d) concerning the 
running of the limitations period, § 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D), do 
not apply in Wallace’s case. 
14 The last day of the one-year period, January 5, 2002, fell 
on a Saturday, so the petition would have been due the 







fourteen-year period from January 7, 2002 through 
September 29, 2015. 
 
A.  Legal Standard 
 
  Equitable tolling applies when a petitioner has been 
prevented in “some extraordinary way” from timely filing 
and has “exercised reasonable diligence” in bringing the 
claims.  Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 2001), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Carey v. Saffold, 
536 U.S. 214 (2002).  The petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing both extraordinary circumstances and 
reasonable diligence.  See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 
408, 418 (2005).  There are no bright lines for determining 
eligibility.  Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 399 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Although this equitable doctrine is used sparingly, 
the assessment is flexible and the particular circumstances 
of the petitioner must be taken into account.  Id.   
 
B.  Extraordinary Circumstances  
In Nara v. Frank, we held that suffering from a 
mental illness does not per se entitle a petitioner to 
equitable tolling.  264 F.3d at 320.  Instead, to qualify as 
an extraordinary circumstance, the mental illness must 
have affected the petitioner’s ability to seek relief in some 
way.  Id.  We did not specify how a court should make that 






that, if his allegations were true, extraordinary 
circumstances may have been present.  So we remanded 
the matter to the District Court to develop the record 
without offering an opinion as to the proper outcome.  Id.  
In Pabon v. Mahanoy, we reiterated that the relevant 
inquiry for purposes of assessing extraordinary 
circumstances is “how severe an obstacle [the 
circumstance] creates with respect to meeting AEDPA’s 
one-year deadline.”15  654 F.3d at 401. 
Wallace suggests that we employ a more rigid 
framework for assessing his extraordinary circumstances 
claim.  He looks to a non-precedential case by a panel of 
our Court, Champney v. Sec’y DOC, 469 F. App’x 113, 
117–18 (3d Cir. 2012), which provided a “non-exhaustive 
list of factors to consider” in determining whether mental 
illness constitutes an extraordinary circumstance for 
equitable tolling purposes.  The Champney factors 
include:  
 
15 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, substantially revised the 
law governing federal habeas corpus.  See In re Minarik, 
166 F.3d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1999).  Among other things, 
AEDPA set a one-year limitations period for filing a 
federal habeas petition.  See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 






(1) whether the petitioner was adjudicated 
incompetent and, if so, when did the 
adjudication occur in relation to the habeas 
statutory period; (2) whether the petitioner 
was institutionalized for his mental 
impairment; (3) whether the petitioner 
handled or assisted in other legal matters 
which required action during the federal 
limitations period; and (4) whether the 
petitioner supported his allegations of 
impairment with extrinsic evidence such as 
evaluations and/or medications. 
Id. at 118 (cleaned up). 
Wallace asks us to apply Champney’s factors.16  
Although he cannot satisfy the first factor because he has 
never been adjudicated as incompetent, he easily satisfies 
factor two, because he has been both voluntarily and 
involuntarily committed at various times and has required 
 
16 We do not regard our Court’s non-precedential opinions 
as binding authority.  See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 
445 F.3d 266, 276 (3d Cir. 2006); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7 
(2018).  Nonetheless, parties remain free to argue that such 
opinions set forth persuasive reasoning.  See New Jersey 







continuous psychiatric care throughout his incarceration.  
He also satisfies factor three: Wallace did not participate 
in any legal proceeding during the one-year limitations 
period; his first post-conviction legal matter was his state 
court PCRA petition in September 2013.  Finally, to 
satisfy factor four, Wallace has provided substantial 
medical records to support his claim.   
We acknowledge that Champney’s non-exhaustive 
list of factors may be relevant in assessing extraordinary 
circumstances in mental illness cases, but we decline to 
adopt Champney as establishing any sort of “test” that 
cabins our analysis.  Indeed, in Wallace’s case, the 
Champney factors provide little more than a starting point.  
The three Champney factors he satisfies simply lend 
support to Wallace’s claim that he genuinely suffers from 
a mental illness—but the existence of his mental illness 
has never been in dispute.   
The record amply demonstrates that Wallace has 
been severely mentally ill for most, or possibly all, of his 
adult life.  Indeed, since his imprisonment, he has not gone 
unmedicated for any significant length of time.  But the 
fact of his serious illness, without more, is not dispositive 
of Wallace’s tolling claim, see Nara, 264 F.3d. at 320, 
particularly because he asks us to excuse an exceptionally 
long delay.  In fact, were we to conclude that his illness is 






filing, then up to this very day, Wallace would not be 
subject to a deadline.  That simply cannot be.   
It is apparent from the record that Wallace has had 
periods of relative stability and good mental health.  We 
can discern that, during those periods, he has been quite 
capable of pursuing legal remedies; indeed, he has done so 
in recent years on a pro se basis in both state and federal 
courts.17  So it is far from sufficient that Wallace has 
demonstrated the existence of a serious illness.  Instead, 
we must consider the totality of the circumstances in 
determining whether the record supports Wallace’s claim 
that he had no periods of sufficiently good mental health 
from 2000 through 2015, during which time he could have 
pursued a federal habeas petition.   
To do so, we look to the medical records Wallace 
has provided to discern whether they support his position 
that it was “impossible” for him to pursue post-conviction 
 
17 Counsel points out that some of Wallace’s court papers 
were drafted by fellow inmates.  But the ability to seek 
assistance and work with others to obtain legal relief is, in 
our view, worthy of consideration in assessing Wallace’s 
equitable tolling claim.  Moreover, it is apparent that 
Wallace drafted at least some of his submissions on his 






remedies during that entire time.18  See Wallace Br. 31.  In 
particular, we focus on what the records show about the 
changes and fluctuations in Wallace’s condition over the 
decade-plus period for which he seeks tolling. 
(1) 2000 to 2001: period of poor mental 
health 
Around the time of his guilty plea, the records 
demonstrate unequivocally that Wallace was seriously ill.  
A doctor’s December 2000 report rated his Global 
 
18 Wallace argues that it was “impossible for [him] to 
pursue his post-conviction remedies because he was 
simply too mentally impaired and overmedicated to focus 
on legal matters for any amount of time.”  Wallace Br. 31 
(emphasis added).  In doing so, he has set a higher bar than 
necessary for himself.  As previously observed, to 
demonstrate extraordinary circumstances, Wallace need 
only have shown that “the alleged mental incompetence 
must somehow have affected the petitioner’s ability to file 
a timely habeas petition.”  Nara, 264 F.3d at 320.  We 
respond to his impossibility claim only because he set this 
higher bar for himself.  To be clear, however, a petitioner 
need not necessarily demonstrate impossibility of pursing 
legal relief in order to show extraordinary circumstances 






Assessment of Functioning (GAF) at a score of 50,19 
indicating serious symptoms and impairment of 
 
19 “The GAF is a numeric rating used by mental health 
practitioners to measure the functional impairment of a 
patient on a 0–100 scale in accordance with the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.”  Funk v. 
CIGNA Group Ins., 648 F.3d 182, 186 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citing Am. Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed., 2000)).  As 
relevant to Wallace, who generally scored in a range from 
50 to 75: 
80–71 means “If symptoms are present, they are transient 
and expectable reactions to psychosocial stressors (e.g., 
difficulty concentrating after family argument); no more 
than slight impairment in social or occupational 
functioning (e.g., temporarily falling behind on projects).”   
70–61 means “Some mild symptoms (e.g., depressed 
mood and mild insomnia) OR some difficulty in social or 
occupational functioning (e.g., theft within the 
household), but generally functioning pretty well, has 
some meaningful interpersonal relationships.”   
60–51 means “Moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and 
circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) OR 
moderate difficulty in social or occupational functioning 
(e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers).” 
50–41 means “Serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, 






functioning.  The same doctor recommended that Wallace 
be placed in the prison’s Special Needs Unit (SNU).  At 
the time, doctors observed that Wallace suffered from 
“psychomotor retardation” and “pseudodementia” and 
looked “haggard” and “overmedicated”; eventually 
doctors recommended Wallace’s placement in the prison’s 
Special Observation Unit (SOU).  JA 391–92.  While in 
the SOU, Wallace showed serious symptoms and suicidal 
ideation, and was examined by doctors almost daily.  
Wallace eventually was discharged to the general 
population, but he began suffering paranoia and was 
promptly readmitted to the SOU.  Records reflect that 
Wallace continued to do poorly through the first half of 
2001.  He suffered paranoid ideations, psychomotor 
retardation, and severe depression.  Doctors continued to 
assess his GAF at around 50 and even recommended that 
he undergo Electroconvulsive Therapy treatment for his 
depression.   
(2)  Summer 2001 through 2003: period of 
improvement 
 Beginning in summer 2001, records demonstrate 
that Wallace showed notable signs of improvement.  He 
 
serious impairment in social or occupational functioning 
(e.g., no friends).” Am. Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic and 






was returned to the SNU, which meant he was no longer 
under near-constant observation as he had been while in 
the SOU.  Wallace’s doctor visits were scheduled less 
frequently, and he was asked to return to the clinic only 
once per month beginning in July 2001.  That continued to 
be his clinic schedule up to and throughout 2005.   
By February 2002, doctors noted that Wallace was 
in partial remission.  In summer 2002, doctors described 
him as “stable,” having “no complaints,” and showing “no 
psychosis.”  JA 490.  By the fall, he even described himself 
as “doing fine on the medications.”  JA 491. 
(3)  2003 through 2006: period of relatively 
good mental health 
In May 2003, Wallace reported that he was “doing 
pretty good” and “doing fine.”  JA 493.  Records suggest 
that he continued to do well throughout 2003 and 2004.  In 
November 2003, doctors assessed his GAF as rising to 65, 
and by March 2004, they rated his GAF as 70; he 
maintained that relatively high GAF through July 2004.   
Toward the end of 2004, the records show that 
Wallace again began something of a decline.  His GAF 
decreased to 65 in December 2004, then 60 in January 
2005, and then 55 in April through August 2005.  Even so, 






By 2006, doctors further reduced the frequency of 
Wallace’s clinic visits.  He was ordered to return to the 
clinic in increments of 60 to 90 days through that year.  
And during that time, he reported clearer thinking and 
stability, with no side effects from medications.  Doctors 
observed that he was “stable” and “doing very well.”  JA 
519.  Throughout 2006 and 2007, Wallace continued to see 
his doctors at 90-day intervals and he consistently reported 
that he felt fine.   
(4) 2007 through 2009: period of remission 
As Magistrate Judge Heffley noted in her R&R, 
Wallace submitted a memorandum indicating that his 
bipolar disorder was stable and in “full remission” for a 
period of “several years” beginning in late 2007 through 
2009.  JA 728 (citing Pet’r Counseled Mem. in Supp. of 
Equitable Tolling at 9). The records support Wallace’s 
description.  In late 2007 and throughout 2008, Wallace’s 
doctors noted that he was “clinically stable” and that his 
bipolar disorder was in “full remission.”  JA 523, 525, 527, 
529.  The records from that period indicate that Wallace 
was stable, calm, had normal thought processes, and did 
not suffer from delusions.  Wallace’s records during this 
timeframe repeatedly note his good personal grooming, 
logical thinking, and intact memory.   







In 2010 and 2011, the records continue to indicate 
that Wallace experienced comparative stability and 
needed only infrequent doctors’ visits (generally at 30-day 
intervals).  Wallace’s GAF was assessed as high as 75 
during this period.   
(6)  2011 to 2013: period of serious 
deterioration 
The records show that Wallace’s period of relative 
stability and well-being came to an end by the summer of 
2011.  In July 2011, Wallace voiced a concern about 
hurting others.  By September of that year, the records 
reflect that he was suffering from “bipolar depression.”  
JA 540.  His religious preoccupation and delusions 
reemerged.  He began to complain of side-effects from his 
medications, and eventually stopped taking some of them.  
He was admitted for psychiatric observation on several 
occasions based on concerns that he could be suicidal or 
might hurt others.    
Doctors once again began to observe psychomotor 
retardation and slow thought-processes.  He showed 
impaired judgment, illogical thinking, poor insight, and 
increasing paranoia.  Despite those challenges with his 
illness, he told a doctor in November 2012 that his goals 






By the end of 2012, Wallace was involuntarily 
committed for mental health treatment because his 
worsening delusions caused him to become a danger to 
others.    
(7)  2013 to 2015: period of relatively poor 
mental health, but successful pursuit of 
state legal relief 
In 2013 through 2015, Wallace continued to 
experience serious mental health issues.  Wallace’s GAF 
deteriorated to the 50s, he had frequent doctor visits, and 
demonstrated impaired and limited judgment and insight.  
He also experienced periods in which delusions and 
paranoia returned along with suicidal ideations, and he 
sometimes required constant observation.  
Yet some entries in the medical records reflect that, 
in 2013–2015, Wallace experienced somewhat better 
mental health than he had demonstrated during the 2011–
2013 timeframe.  Nonetheless, Wallace’s mental health 
did not fully rebound to the period of relative wellness that 
he had shown in the 2002–2006 and 2007–2010 time 
periods.   
Even so, Wallace was well enough to pursue state 
PCRA relief.  By September 3, 2013, he had filed his 
PCRA petition, albeit with assistance.  And, notably, by 






informing the PCRA court that he did so without 
assistance.  See JA 1372 (Third PCRA Supplement, dated 
Dec. 19, 2013) (“Unlike my previous supplements and 
PCRA, this supplement is submitted without assistance, 
pro se.”).   
* * * 
The foregoing summary reflects the highlights of 
our minute review of the hundreds of pages of medical 
records that Wallace has provided.  Our examination 
confirms that there were substantial periods—several 
years worth, in fact—during which Wallace appears to 
have experienced relatively good mental health, with 
periods in which he was in “full remission” and stable.  We 
stress our agreement with Magistrate Judge Heffley’s 
finding that the documentary record indicates that Wallace 
was stable and in remission during the 2007 to 2009 time 
period, JA 728, 730–31, and therefore was not prevented 
by his illness from pursuing a habeas petition in those 
years.20  In fact, there likely was a considerably longer 
 
20 Because we have identified a period of longer than one 
year in which Wallace has failed to demonstrate the 
existence of extraordinary circumstances, we need not 
engage in the intricate counting that is required to compute 
any hypothetical tolling period.  See Schlueter v. Varner, 






period—from as early as 2003 and ending as late as 
2011—during which Wallace’s mental condition was 
sufficiently stable to have allowed him to pursue his legal 
rights.   
The burden remains on Wallace to establish that 
extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a 
habeas petition for the entirety of the period for which he 
has sought tolling.  The records provide insufficient 
support for his claim. 
Wallace responds by arguing that, despite his 
remission during the 2007–2009 timeframe, the record 
still shows that he was heavily medicated.  According to 
Wallace, his condition was “controlled not cured,” and the 
medications “dulled” his ability to think clearly about his 
legal case.  Wallace Br. at 34–35.   
Wallace fails to cite record support for his claim that 
his medications caused him to suffer a “significant cost to 
his cognitive function.”  See id. at 17.  Nonetheless, 
accepting that Wallace’s medications interfered to some 
extent with his ability to think clearly, we are not satisfied 
that the records demonstrate that his medications 
prevented him from pursuing legal relief before 2013.  See 
id. at 30–31.  Moreover, and strikingly, Wallace was able 
in 2013 to pursue state post-conviction relief—despite his 
many medications and his claimed decline in mental 






from 2013–2015 to those from earlier time periods, 
including the 2007–2009 timeframe, compel us to 
reiterate: Wallace did not experience extraordinary 
circumstances preventing him from pursuing legal relief 
when his mental health was comparatively better, even 
though he was taking medications at the time.  See Wallace 
Br. 30–31. 
 Wallace also argues that remand—and 
authorization of funds to hire an expert—is necessary 
before we may dispose of his claim.  We disagree.  There 
is substantial documentary evidence in the record before 
us, and it supports our conclusion that Wallace’s mental 
illness did not pose a sufficiently severe obstacle to his 
pursuit of legal remedies for a period of several years.  We 
conclude that Wallace has failed to produce evidence 
sufficient to warrant a hearing on that issue.  Compare 
Pabon, 654 F.3d at 401–02 (because there was substantial 
evidence of the requisite extraordinary circumstances, 
remand was ordered for an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue); Nara, 264 F.3d at 320 (although there was no 
evidence of record, because Nara’s petition was pro se and 
because he “presented evidence of ongoing, if not 
consecutive[,] periods of mental incompetency,” remand 






C.  Reasonable Diligence 
 
In addition to his claim of extraordinary 
circumstances, Wallace argues that he showed reasonable 
diligence in pursuing legal relief, the second prong he 
must satisfy in order to avail himself of the equitable 
tolling doctrine.  For the period from 2002 until 2013, his 
diligence claim essentially overlaps with his extraordinary 
circumstances claim: Wallace contends that legal filings 
of any kind were “impossible” for him due to his mental 
illness.  See Wallace Br. 30–31.  We are skeptical of this 
claim because, as we have already observed, the medical 
records do not support Wallace’s position.   
Yet even if we were to accept that Wallace showed 
reasonable diligence under the circumstances prior to 
2013, it was certainly possible for him to file by early 
2013.  It was then that he was mentally well enough to 
have pursued PCRA relief.21  Yet he did not file a federal 
 
21 According to his 2017 affidavit, Wallace first began 
discussing his legal case with a doctor in “fall of 2012,” 
and by “early 2013” he began working on a draft PCRA 
petition.  JA 356.  He ultimately filed the PCRA petition 
in September 2013.  Thus, nearly a year passed from the 
time Wallace began thinking about filing a PCRA petition 
until he actually filed one.  This delay further undermines 






habeas petition in 2013, waiting instead until September 
2015.  Wallace argues that he is entitled to equitable 
tolling of this approximately two-year period because he 
was pursuing PCRA relief, and his choice reflects 
reasonable diligence.22  We disagree. 
Had the PCRA Court concluded that Wallace’s 
2013 PCRA petition was timely filed under a statutory 
exception to Pennsylvania’s one-year limitations period, 
then that state petition would have been “properly filed.”23  
 
22 In his brief, Wallace argues that he was quite ill during 
the 2013–2015 timeframe; he “see-sawed between the 
psychiatric observation unit and the general population.”  
Wallace Br. 37.  As discussed supra, the medical records 
support this claim.  Yet Wallace still pursued his PCRA 
petition during that same time, successfully engaging 
assistance when he needed it.  We reiterate our view that 
Wallace’s ability to pursue legal relief while experiencing 
what may well have been serious symptoms undermines 
his position that it was “impossible” to have filed legal 
documents sooner due to his mental illness.  See Wallace 
Br. 31. 
23 Pennsylvania treats its statute of limitations as 
jurisdictional and therefore does not permit equitable 
tolling.  There are three statutory exceptions that may 






See Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 2003); 
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).  But the PCRA Court did not 
accept Wallace’s argument that a statutory exception 
applied, and it dismissed his PCRA petition as untimely.  
We afford deference to that determination.  See Merritt, 
326 F.3d at 168.  Accordingly, Wallace’s PCRA petition 
was not “properly filed” for statutory tolling purposes.   
Wallace nonetheless argues that his decision to 
pursue a PCRA petition reflects diligence in pursuing legal 
relief, and that we should not hold the approximately two-
year period during which he pursued PCRA relief against 
him.  Yet he could have filed a protective federal habeas 
petition during the pendency of his PCRA proceeding, as 
described by the Supreme Court in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 
544 U.S. 408, 416–17 (2005).  His failure to do so 
undermines his diligence claim.   
In Pace, the Supreme Court addressed a claim for 
both statutory and equitable tolling by a habeas petitioner 
who, like Wallace, had first pursued state collateral relief 
that was ultimately rejected as untimely.  The Supreme 
Court discussed the possible unfairness that arises when 
such an individual, in good faith, attempts to exhaust state 
remedies—a process that may take years—only to 
 
attempted to invoke the exception for newly discovered 






ultimately learn that the state courts have rejected the 
claim as untimely and therefore never “properly filed”:  “A 
prisoner seeking state postconviction relief might avoid 
this predicament . . . by filing a ‘protective’ petition in 
federal court and asking the federal court to stay and abey 
the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are 
exhausted.”  Id. at 416. 
Although the discussion in Pace pertained to 
statutory tolling, it suggests that Wallace’s pursuit of a 
PCRA petition—without making some effort to preserve 
his federal rights—weighs against a conclusion that he 
was reasonably diligent for equitable tolling purposes.  See 
Palacios v. Stephens, 723 F.3d 600, 608 (5th Cir. 2013).  
Moreover, Wallace had notice by September 24, 2014 that 
the Court of Common Pleas had rejected his timeliness 
arguments.  He surely was aware by that time that his 
efforts in state court were unlikely to be successful and 
that federal relief could be necessary.  See White v. Martel, 
601 F.3d 882, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2010).  Yet Wallace waited 
another full year—until September 29, 2015—to file his 
federal habeas petition.  We simply cannot conclude that 
such delay reflects reasonable diligence in pursuing a 
federal habeas claim. 
Finally, Wallace contends that he relied on the 
mistaken advice of a fellow inmate in reaching the 






“reset” the deadlines for his federal habeas petition.  
Wallace Br. 40.  But erroneous legal advice is not a basis 
for invoking equitable tolling.  Schlueter v. Varner, 384 
F.3d 69, 76 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing that, in non-capital 
cases, attorney error generally is not a basis for equitable 
tolling); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(holding that misunderstanding the exhaustion 
requirement does not excuse a failure to comply with the 
statute of limitations requirement). 
* * * 
In sum, even were we to conclude that extraordinary 
circumstances prevented Wallace from filing his habeas 
petition before 2013, he was insufficiently diligent in 
preserving his federal rights between 2013 and 2015 so 
that he might avail himself of equitable tolling.  Wallace’s 
lack of reasonable diligence provides an independent 
ground for rejection of his equitable tolling claim.  We also 
view the fact that no expert testimony would reasonably 
assist Wallace in overcoming his lack of diligence in 
pursuing habeas relief between 2013 and 2015 as 
reinforcing our determination that an evidentiary hearing 
on his equitable tolling claim is unnecessary. 
V. ACTUAL INNOCENCE 
As an alternative to equitable tolling, Wallace 






limitations because he is actually innocent of murder.  
Specifically, at the time of the crime, Wallace claims he 
was intoxicated by Ritalin and that it rendered him 
temporarily insane such that he was incapable of forming 
the requisite intent to commit murder. 
In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013), the 
Supreme Court discussed the “actual innocence gateway” 
first recognized in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314–15 
(1995), which is an equitable exception to certain 
procedural requirements permitted only in those rare 
habeas cases implicating a fundamental miscarriage of 
justice.  In McQuiggin, the petitioner filed a federal habeas 
petition more than a decade after his first-degree murder 
conviction became final.  To overcome the statute of 
limitations problem he faced, he provided newly 
discovered evidence of his actual innocence—specifically, 
the affidavits of three witnesses attesting that the true 
perpetrator had either confessed to them or shown them 
his blood-stained clothing.  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve a Circuit split concerning whether 
there is an exception to AEDPA’s one-year statute of 
limitations for a claim of actual innocence. 
The Supreme Court concluded that such an 
exception exists.  Justice Ginsburg, writing for a five-
justice majority, stated: “We hold that actual innocence, if 






may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . 
or, as in this case, expiration of the statute of limitations.  
We caution, however, that tenable actual-innocence 
gateway pleas are rare.”  McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386.  To 
pass through that gateway, the petitioner must persuade 
the District Court that “in light of the new evidence, no 
juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id.  Although delay in 
filing is not a bar to relief, it nonetheless remains “a factor 
in determining whether actual innocence has been reliably 
shown.”  Id. at 387. 
* * * 
Thus, McQuiggin establishes an exception to the 
statute of limitations, even where a petitioner may not 
qualify for an extension to the statute of limitations via 
equitable tolling.24  See McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 400.  To 
satisfy the demanding actual innocence exception, a 
 
24 Ultimately, the Supreme Court observed that Perkins 
himself probably was not entitled to the exception 
recognized in his case because the District Court had 
determined that the information in the affidavits he 
provided was “substantially available” at trial and, even if 
“new,” “was hardly adequate to show that . . . no 







petitioner must (1) present new, reliable evidence of his 
innocence; and (2) show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it is more likely than not that no reasonable 
juror would have convicted him (i.e., a reasonable juror 
would have reasonable doubt about his guilt) in light of the 
new evidence.  Reeves v. Fayette SCI, 897 F.3d 154, 160 
(3d Cir. 2018).   
We review de novo whether a petitioner’s evidence 
is sufficient to pass through the actual innocence gateway.  
Munchinski, 694 F.3d at 337.  We do not make an 
independent factual determination of what actually 
happened.  Rather, we assess the likely impact that the new 
evidence would have had on reasonable jurors.  Reeves, 
897 F.3d at 161.  The standard does not require absolute 
certainty of guilt or innocence, but it is demanding and will 
be satisfied only in rare and extraordinary cases where the 
evidence of innocence is so strong that it undermines 
confidence in the trial’s outcome.  Id. 
For reasons we cannot discern, the District Court 
never addressed Wallace’s actual innocence claim.  
Wallace contends that, by limiting his appointment of 
counsel to the issue of his mental state from 2001 through 
2013, the Magistrate Judge effectively prevented him from 
arguing actual innocence and summarily denied the claim 
by failing to address it on the merits.  And then, when 






objections to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, the District 
Court neglected to address that claim as well.  
Accordingly, “[t]here is not even a finding on which to 
permit meaningful appellate review.”  Wallace Br. 57.  
Wallace argues that the failure of the District Court to 
address the issue warrants reversal and remand. 
We agree that it was error for the District Court to 
have failed to address his actual innocence claim.  We 
need not direct a remand, however.  In exercising de novo 
review, it is apparent to us that Wallace cannot meet the 
stringent actual innocence standard.  He has put forth no 
new, reliable evidence of actual innocence, nor has he 
established that, in light of the evidence, no reasonable 
juror would have convicted him. 
A. New, Reliable Evidence of Actual Innocence25 
Wallace contends that counsel failed to adequately 
investigate the role that Ritalin played in causing his 
 
25 Because Wallace committed the physical act of killing 
his wife, his actual innocence claim turns on whether he 
has a defense to murder based on a lack of mental capacity.  
Some of our sister Courts of Appeals have concluded that 
“actual innocence” claims can encompass complete 
defenses such as insanity.  For instance, in Britz v. Cowan, 
192 F.3d 1101, 1103 (7th Cir. 1999), the Seventh Circuit 






psychosis.  He claims that counsel’s failure to explore a 
link between psychosis and Ritalin undermines confidence 
in the outcome of Wallace’s criminal proceeding.     
 
still claim actual innocence of murder by invocation of an 
insanity defense.  But other Courts of Appeals consider 
this an open question.  See Rozzelle v. Secretary Fla. Dep’t 
Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1015 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Today, we 
need not decide whether Schlup permits a claim of actual 
innocence based on ‘new reliable’ evidence of a complete 
affirmative defense that renders the conduct of conviction 
wholly noncriminal and requires acquittal.”).  Previously, 
we have assumed without deciding that both mental illness 
and involuntary intoxication defenses may qualify for the 
actual innocence gateway.  See In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 
591, 607–08 (3d Cir. 1999); Glass v. Vaughn, 65 F.3d 13, 
16–17 (3d Cir. 1995).  But we have never reached the 
question of whether such defenses can, as a matter of law, 
satisfy the actual innocence standard because, in all cases 
to date, the defendants failed to demonstrate actual 
innocence on the facts.  Similarly, Wallace does not 
present a factual case that meets the rigorous actual 
innocence standard.  So once again, we need not decide 
definitively whether, as a matter of law, a defense of 
insanity or involuntary intoxication may qualify for the 







For actual innocence purposes, “new” evidence 
includes both newly discovered evidence as well as 
exculpatory evidence that counsel failed to discover or 
present at trial.  Reeves v. Fayette SCI, 897 F.3d 154, 163–
64 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[W]hen a petitioner asserts ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to 
discover or present to the fact-finder the very exculpatory 
evidence that demonstrates his actual innocence, such 
evidence constitutes new evidence for purposes of the 
Schlup actual innocence gateway.”).  In addition, although 
there is no diligence requirement, we have held that a court 
may consider how the timing of the habeas petition bears 
on the probable reliability of the “new” evidence.  Id. at 
161.   
We have serious doubts that Wallace’s Ritalin 
evidence constitutes “new, reliable evidence of actual 
innocence” for at least four reasons: (1) the evidence is not 
“new” because, during preparations for trial, defense 
counsel provided the doctors who examined Wallace with 
medical records showing that Wallace was prescribed 
Ritalin; (2) the evidence is not “reliable” because 
Wallace’s strongest evidence is, at most, a tentative 
opinion rendered after more than a decade of delay; (3) the 
evidence does not show actual innocence because 
Pennsylvania law does not recognize involuntary 






does not show actual innocence because Pennsylvania 
courts view the etiology of insanity as irrelevant. 
(1) Wallace’s evidence is not new because 
defense counsel provided the doctors who 
examined him with medical records 
showing that Wallace was prescribed 
Ritalin.  
Wallace’s purportedly “new” evidence turns on his 
discovery that taking Ritalin may have either caused or 
exacerbated his psychosis.26  He argues that “[h]is experts 
were never able to evaluate what role Ritalin played on the 
deeply psychotic condition which led to [the crime].”  
 
26 Wallace does not contend that the science underlying his 
Ritalin claim—that is, that Ritalin may contribute to 
psychosis—is “new.”  The possibility that Ritalin may 
exacerbate psychosis has long been public knowledge.  
For instance, the record contains a 1997 version of the 
Ritalin label, which warned against Ritalin use with 
psychotic children because it may “exacerbate 
symptoms.”  JA 341.  Indeed, Wallace’s claim that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate the 
link between Ritalin and Wallace’s psychosis relies on 
only an assumption that the science was established at the 







Wallace Br. 49.  Although Wallace argues otherwise, the 
record shows that defense experts reviewed records 
reflecting that Wallace had been prescribed Ritalin before 
he committed the crime.   
Wallace’s medical records, in particular those from 
psychiatrist Dori Middleman, showed that Wallace was 
taking Ritalin for ADHD in the years prior to the murder, 
beginning as early as 1997.  In Dr. Sadoff’s June 2000 
report, he noted that Dr. Middleman had prescribed both 
Paxil and Ritalin for Wallace.  Although Dr. Cooke did not 
directly mention Ritalin, he stated in his June 2000 report 
that he had reviewed Dr. Middleman’s records, including 
Wallace’s medications for ADHD.   
The contention, then, that Wallace’s experts were 
unable to evaluate the potential role of Ritalin is not 
supported by the record.  Even if Drs. Cooke and Sadoff 
may have failed to appreciate Ritalin’s significance at the 
time they examined Wallace, it cannot be said that the 
information was unavailable to them.  
(2) Wallace’s Ritalin evidence is not reliable 
because it is based on a tentative opinion. 
Let us suppose that Ritalin’s potential contributing 
role in Wallace’s psychosis is “new” because the defense 
experts did not recognize its import at the time of trial 






Ritalin possibly played in Wallace’s violent behavior 
constitutes “reliable” evidence of actual innocence.  Even 
up to today, after pursuing this collateral attack for years, 
Wallace presents little more than one doctor’s tentative 
hypothesis that Ritalin might have exacerbated his 
psychosis. 
In August 2014, Dr. Cooke reported that although 
Ritalin “did not cause the psychotic episode” leading up to 
the stabbing death, it “exacerbated [Wallace’s] psychosis 
and contributed to the disinhibition that led to the offense.”  
JA 801.  Dr. Cooke stated that he did not provide this 
opinion sooner because he did not know that Wallace had 
been taking Ambien, Ritalin, and Paxil around the time of 
the killing.27  His 2014 opinion suggests that some, as-yet-
unidentified medical practitioner could opine that “the 
involuntary intoxication from the medication exacerbated 
[Wallace’s] psychosis”—although Dr. Cooke himself did 
not attest to that.  JA 801.  Instead, he suggests that 
Wallace “would need an M.D. to give expert testimony 
regarding the effects of the medication.”  Id.   
 
27 As noted previously, however, Dr. Cooke stated in June 
2000 that he had reviewed Wallace’s medical records, 
which included the records from Dr. Middleman showing 






Furthermore, Dr. Cooke went on to opine that his 
new assessment concerning Ritalin’s contributing role did 
not change his view—originally expressed in his June 
2000 report—that Wallace knew that what he was doing 
was wrong under “man’s law.”  Id.  Dr. Cooke concluded 
that his “opinion regarding competency and insanity is not 
affected by [his] recently acquired knowledge of the 
medications [Wallace] was on at the time of the offense.”  
Id.  Clearly then, Dr. Cooke’s 2014 assessment provides 
only a tentative opinion on the possible existence of a 
partial defense, and—even taking Ritalin consumption 
into account—it reiterates his continued view that Wallace 
was not legally insane at the time he killed his wife.   
Moreover, as observed in Reeves, we may take into 
account how the timing of the claim bears on the reliability 
of the evidence.  Reeves, 897 F.3d at 161.  Here, any 
information about the possible effects of medications that 
Wallace was taking at the time of his wife’s tragic death is 
now more than twenty years old.  Even back in 2000, 
Wallace himself did not recall precisely which 
medications he took before the killing.  And with the 
passage of so many years, Dr. Cooke seems to have 
forgotten that his earlier review of the records would have 
revealed to him that Wallace was prescribed Ritalin.  It 
strains credulity to imagine that, at this late date, it would 
be possible to gain any further, reliable insight into how 






which it might have affected his state of mind at the time 
of his wife’s killing.  So for that reason as well, Dr. 
Cooke’s tentative 2014 opinion that Ritalin may have 
contributed to Wallace’s psychosis falls short of providing 
reliable evidence of actual innocence. 
(3) Wallace’s evidence does not show actual 
innocence because Pennsylvania has not 
recognized involuntary intoxication as a 
defense to murder. 
At least in part, Wallace’s claim of actual innocence 
relies on an involuntary intoxication defense.28  Yet 
whether an involuntary intoxication defense exists under 
Pennsylvania law is highly doubtful.29  No Pennsylvania 
 
28 Although Wallace ingested Ritalin voluntarily, he 
argues that he was involuntarily intoxicated because he 
was taking the medication pursuant to a doctor’s 
prescription.  Jurisdictions recognizing an involuntary 
intoxication defense apply it in the case of an unexpected 
intoxication arising from a medically prescribed drug.  
Commonwealth v. Smith, 831 A.2d 636, 639 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2003). 
29 In contrast to involuntary intoxication, Pennsylvania 
law expressly provides that voluntary intoxication may 
provide a defense to reduce the degree of murder, although 






statute or Supreme Court case establishes involuntary 
intoxication as a defense to murder, and the handful of 
Superior Court cases that discuss the concept demonstrate 
that, while there remains a possibility of such a defense, 
no defendant to date has successfully invoked it. 
For instance, in Commonwealth v. Smith, 831 A.3d 
636 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), the defendant ingested alcohol 
while wearing a prescription pain patch; she then drove her 
car and was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI).  
She claimed that the effects of the medication and alcohol 
together unexpectedly rendered her involuntarily 
intoxicated.  In appealing her DUI conviction, she asked 
 
defense to a criminal charge.  18 Pa. C.S. § 308.  A 
defendant cannot, however, be insulated from criminal 
liability by claiming insanity due to voluntarily ingesting 
drugs or alcohol—regardless of whether the person was 
unaware of the effect that the drugs or alcohol might have.  
Commonwealth v. Henry, 524 Pa. 135, 149 (Pa. 1990) 
(prohibiting insanity and GBMI defenses when defendant 
voluntarily ingested alcohol, even if he was unaware of the 
adverse effects the alcohol would have on him).  
Furthermore, voluntary intoxication cannot negate the 
element of malice for purposes of reducing third-degree 
murder to manslaughter.  Commonwealth v. Hicks, 483 Pa. 






the Superior Court to consider whether Pennsylvania law 
recognizes involuntary intoxication as a defense.   
The Superior Court observed that, in contrast to 
voluntary intoxication, which is recognized by statute, 
Pennsylvania law “does not specify whether an 
involuntary intoxication defense is available.”  Id. at 639; 
see also Commonwealth v. DuPont, 860 A.2d 525, 536 
(Pa. Super. 2004) (rejecting PCRA petitioner’s claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to raise 
a prescription drug involuntary intoxication defense 
because no appellate decision has affirmatively 
acknowledged the existence of such a defense under 
Pennsylvania law); Commonwealth v. Plank, 478 A.2d 
872, 875 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (stating that “[i]nvoluntary 
intoxication may, in certain circumstances, provide a 
defense to the criminal charge,” but an alcoholic blackout 
cannot qualify).   
The Smith court observed that other jurisdictions 
have permitted involuntary intoxication as a complete 
defense to criminal responsibility “premised upon the 
notion that [the defendant] was temporarily rendered 
legally insane at the time he or she committed the offense.”  
831 A.3d at 639.  Those jurisdictions have recognized 
involuntary intoxication in situations, for instance, “where 
unexpected intoxication results from a medically 






suffers from a physiological or psychological condition 
that renders him abnormally susceptible to a legal 
intoxicant.”  Id.  Where it is available, a key component of 
the defense is that the defendant is not culpable in causing 
the intoxication.  Id.  In Smith’s case, she had knowingly 
introduced alcohol into her system, and its intoxicating 
tendencies should have been known to her.  Thus, 
assuming (but not deciding) that an involuntary 
intoxication defense is viable, the court held that 
“Pennsylvania . . . would not characterize intoxication 
produced by the voluntary consumption of a prescription 
drug and alcohol as ‘involuntary’ even if that consumption 
was without knowledge of a synergistic effect.”30  Id. at 
640. 
 The Superior Court’s discussion in Smith suggests 
that a defendant who, like Wallace, has taken prescription 
drugs that rendered him mentally incompetent may have a 
 
30 A decade later, in the unreported case of Commonwealth 
v. McDonald, No. 880 EDA 2012, 2013 WL 11261654 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2013), an arsonist raised an involuntary 
intoxication defense based on the use of prescription 
medications.  The Superior Court observed that “neither 
courts nor our legislature has recognized the doctrine of 
involuntary intoxication,” at least outside the context of a 







complete or partial defense—but only if he can show that 
the prescription drug rendered him legally insane.  Thus, 
involuntary intoxication would, at most, have provided 
Wallace another avenue for arguing insanity.   
(4) Wallace’s evidence does not show actual 
innocence because Pennsylvania 
considers the etiology of insanity 
irrelevant. 
 Finally, the late-discovered possibility of a causal 
role for Ritalin in Wallace’s mental condition at the time 
of his wife’s fatal stabbing fails to support his actual 
innocence.  Under Pennsylvania law, the cause of insanity 
is irrelevant to the defense.  Plank, 478 A.2d at 875.  
Indeed, that legal proposition is consistent with the PCRA 
Courts’ rejection of Wallace’s “new evidence” claim: 
“The ‘new facts’ asserted by defendant, including his 
claim of involuntary intoxication by prescription 
medication, were not new, rather they were different 
iterations of an old issue, defendant’s mental health at the 
time he killed his wife.”  JA 71 (PCRA opinion); see also 
JA 79 (Superior Court denial of PCRA appeal, stating 
“these are not ‘newly discovered facts,’ but merely ‘a 
newly willing source for previously known facts’”).   
At the time of the events in question, Wallace had a 
potential insanity defense based on his psychosis.  Four 






offered opinions that he was sane at the time of the crime.  
The later-discovered possible cause of Wallace’s 
psychosis—i.e., Wallace’s consumption of Ritalin—is not 
“new evidence” of his innocence.  Under Pennsylvania 
law, even if Wallace had been insane at the time of the 
crime, the cause of the insanity would not be significant to 
his invocation of the insanity defense.  Evidence 
concerning the etiology of Wallace’s alleged insanity adds 
nothing. 
B. More Likely Than Not No Reasonable Juror 
Would Convict 
Apart from whether Wallace has provided “new, 
reliable evidence” of actual innocence concerning 
Ritalin’s causal or contributing role in his psychosis, we 
also conclude that the evidence is not so strong that, in 
light of the record as a whole, no reasonable juror could 
vote to convict him.  Rather, Wallace’s evidence simply 
provides an additional exculpatory fact that a jury could 
have considered (if the matter had gone to trial) in 
reaching a decision about whether Wallace had the mens 






In Pennsylvania, the mens rea for murder is that the 
killing is committed with “malice aforethought.”31  See 
Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168 (Pa. 2017).  
Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court has long defined malice as 
follows: 
[I]t is not malice in its ordinary understanding 
alone, a particular ill-will, a spite or a grudge. 
Malice is a legal term, implying much more. 
It comprehends not only a particular ill-will, 
but every case where there is wickedness of 
disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, 
recklessness of consequences, and a mind 
regardless of social duty, although a 
particular person may not be intended to be 
injured. 
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (Pa. 1868)).  
Wallace argues that he is actually innocent because 
he was legally insane and thus unable to form malice to 
commit murder.  Under Pennsylvania law, legal insanity 
“means that, at the time of the commission of the offense, 
the actor was laboring under such a defect of reason, from 
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality 
 
31 “Malice” differentiates murder from all other types of 
homicide, such as manslaughter.  See Commonwealth v. 






of the act he was doing or, if the actor did know the quality 
of the act, that he did not know that what he was doing was 
wrong.”  18 Pa. C.S. § 315(b).  Wallace argues that “[n]o 
juror presented with this evidence [of his taking Ritalin 
and its potential effect on his psychosis]—in addition to 
psycho-pharmacologist expert testimony for which Mr. 
Wallace has repeatedly begged—would have found he had 
the requisite mens rea to intentionally kill his wife.”  
Wallace Br. 52.  We disagree. 
It is possible that Wallace’s “new” evidence 
concerning Ritalin’s potential role could have been useful 
to his defense counsel had he proceeded to trial.  But, in 
light of the record as a whole, the evidence is hardly so 
strong as to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
it would have been more likely for a reasonable juror to 
have refused to convict him of murder.  That is because 
there was also substantial record evidence supporting a 
conclusion that Wallace did have the requisite mens rea to 
commit that crime.   
We are mindful that Wallace’s expert, Dr. Cooke, 
opined in June 2000 that, although Wallace did not act 
with “malice” in the colloquial sense, he was not legally 
insane at the time of the murder: 
Wallace was overtly and grossly psychotic at 
the time of the offense, and . . . his actions 






for his psychosis, it is my opinion that this 
offense would not have occurred.  It is also 
my opinion that because of his psychosis he 
could not conform his behavior to the 
requirements of law and therefore he would 
meet the criteria for Guilty but Mentally Ill.  
However, though he believed that he was 
acting based on a higher law, he did know 
that by Man’s law what he did would be 
viewed as wrong, and that the police would 
come looking for him.  Therefore, it is my 
opinion that he does not meet the stricter 
M’Naughten standard for Insanity. . . .  [I]t 
is my opinion that Mr. Wallace acted without 
malice.  Rather, based on his delusions, he 
felt he was freeing his wife from an evil 
world and sending her to heaven.   
JA 277 (emphasis added).  
  Similarly, Dr. Sadoff opined in his June 2000 report 
that Wallace stabbed his wife “with a benevolent intent 
and without malice, i.e., without the intent to harm her, but 
rather to help her get out of the misery of this world.”  JA 
259.  But Dr. Sadoff went on to opine that Wallace acted 
with intent:  
Mr. Wallace knew that he was stabbing his 






His behavior indicates that he wanted to 
avoid the police and knew that taking 
another’s life was against the law. . . . Mr. 
Wallace had the ability to form the intent 
to kill his wife, which is what he intended 
to do, and carried out his intention. 
JA 259 (emphasis added). 
  Wallace argues that both defense doctors’ reports 
refer to a “lack of malice,” so Wallace did not satisfy the 
legal element of “malice” for purposes of murder.  We 
remain unpersuaded.  It is readily apparent that the two 
doctors were using the colloquial sense of “malice” to 
indicate ill will or spite, not the legal term of art under 
Pennsylvania law.   
  For instance, in a follow-up report dated November 
27, 2000, in which defense counsel specifically asked Dr. 
Cooke to opine on whether Wallace acted with malice, he 
stated that “because [Wallace] acted out these delusions 
believing that what he was doing was out of love and right 
in the eyes of God, he acted without malice.”  JA 312.  
While acting “out of love” may indicate that Wallace was 
not hateful or angry, this does not mean that, as a matter 
of Pennsylvania law, he did not act without regard to social 
duty or in disregard of the consequences of his actions.  
Similarly, Dr. Sadoff opined that Wallace was not acting 






intent to harm [his wife], but rather to help her get out of 
the misery of this world.”  JA 259.  Again, the view that 
Wallace acted with a benevolent intent is not at odds with 
a conclusion that he acted with malice as it is defined 
under Pennsylvania law. 
 In contrast with the two defense doctors, the 
Commonwealth’s expert, Dr. Timothy Michals, did cite 
the correct legal definition of malice.  And Dr. Michals 
concluded unequivocally that Wallace’s actions satisfied 
that definition: 
It is my understanding that malice is defined 
as, “Thus, killing is with malice if the killer 
acts with: first, an intention to kill, or second, 
an intent to inflict serious bodily harm, or 
third, (a wickedness of disposition, hardness 
of heart, cruelty, recklessness of 
consequences, and a mind regardless of 
social duty indicating an unjustified disregard 
for the probability of death or great bodily 
harm and an extreme indifference to the value 
of human life) (a conscious disregard of an 
unjustified and extremely high risk that his 
actions might cause death or serious bodily 
harm).[”]  
It is my opinion that Mr. Wallace’s killing 






it is my opinion that he intended to inflict 
serious bodily harm.  Thirdly, it is my 
opinion, based on the review of the autopsy 
and the photographs of Mrs. Wallace, that 
Mr. Wallace acted with wickedness of 
disposition, hardness of the heart, cruelty 
and recklessness in taking his wife’s life 
and this was not a benevolent killing. 
JA 1448 (emphasis added).   
 Thus, the doctors’ reports provide strong evidence 
that Wallace was not “actually innocent” on the basis of 
insanity.  Wallace’s counsel, attorney Andes, recognized 
as much.  During a September 26, 2000 hearing, he 
argued: “[B]ased on the psychological/psychiatric reports 
that I have received from my experts, there is almost no 
chance of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity . 
. . [and] we will be looking at a case where the jury will 
have to decide if he was guilty but mentally ill.”  JA 1057 
(emphasis added).   
 In addition to the doctors’ reports, the record 
demonstrates that Wallace,  after killing his wife, acted in 
a manner that could support a reasonable juror’s 
conclusion that he understood what he was doing, that it 
was wrong, and that it would subject him to arrest.  Indeed, 
many of his actions could be viewed as conscious efforts 






 For instance, Wallace told police that, after the 
killing, he put the knife in a drawer, showered, got dressed, 
and went to a Wawa convenience store.  He apparently 
locked the door to the house when he left, because all 
doors to the house were found to be locked when the police 
arrived.  Wallace told police that he left the Wawa for the 
Downingtown train station from which he took a train to 
Philadelphia.  Although he claimed that he intended to 
commit suicide, he also explained that he left 
Downingtown for Philadelphia because he “thought the 
police would be looking for me there.”  JA 969.   
 Similarly, Wallace told Dr. Sadoff in June 2000 
that, after the stabbing, he “showered, changed clothes and 
got out.  He said he got out in a hurry in case she [Eileen] 
got hold of the police. . . .  He did know the police would 
be looking for him. . . .”  JA 257.  The arresting officers 
also testified that Wallace had changed his clothes, and 
that, when they discovered him in Thirtieth Street Station 
in Philadelphia, he appeared to be “trying to blend in.”  JA 
1107.   
 In addition, on the day after the killing, Wallace had 
a steady and seemingly rational demeanor.  He appeared 
to the officers who interviewed him as calm, courteous, 
conversational, and not upset.  During a suppression 
hearing, one detective testified to how calm and normal 






Sir, his tone and inflection as he was – in 
narrative form going through the events that 
– of the evening, to me was a normal 
conversation form.  The way he was 
conversing was a normal conversation 
everybody would have.  There was tone, 
there was inflection.  I don’t remember 
emotional appearance on his face or anything 
like that, but it was clear to me that he was 
fully aware of the statement he was 
making and he was telling us as best he 
could in detail of what happened. 
JA 1144 (emphasis added). 
 We recognize that the record evidence concerning 
Wallace’s behavior and demeanor after committing the 
crime is not dispositive of his mental health or ability to 
form a mens rea for murder.  Yet having such evidence 
before the finders of fact could support a reasonable 
juror’s conclusion that Wallace was in control of his 
actions and emotions and not so psychotic that he could 
not understand how to behave or make rational decisions. 
Indeed, as the trial date approached, Wallace’s 
counsel decided to advocate that the insanity issue be 
presented to the jury as a fact issue:  “We have taken the 
position that even though our doctors do not indicate that 






presented to a jury.  You’ll have to decide that.”  JA 1232.  
In response, the prosecution made clear that, depending on 
how mental health was to be presented by the defense, it 
“may be forced to put on a big rebuttal case.”  JA 1237.  
These comments demonstrate that the issue of Wallace’s 
sanity and ability to form the requisite mens rea would 
have been hotly contested at trial.   
In sum, in light of the “new” evidence, a reasonable 
juror might have concluded that Wallace was too mentally 
ill to form the mens rea to commit murder.  On the other 
hand, a reasonable juror might well have concluded that 
the doctors’ reports, coupled with evidence concerning 
Wallace’s actions and demeanor around the time of the 
crime, indicated that he did possess the requisite intent to 
commit murder.  When there exists sufficiently strong 
competing evidence undermining an innocence claim, a 
defendant is not entitled to pass through the “actual 
innocence” gateway. 
  Our decision in Glass v. Vaughn, 65 F.3d 13, 16–17 
(3d Cir. 1995), illustrates this point.  Glass argued that his 
PTSD caused him to be in a dissociative state at the time 
he committed a killing, undermining his ability to form the 
requisite intent.  We concluded that Glass did not satisfy 
the “no reasonable juror” standard and thus was not 
“actually innocent.”  Despite the new evidence of Glass’s 






verdict: “there was evidence that Glass went to the murder 
scene armed and that he had earlier behaved violently 
towards the victim.  Moreover, when arrested, Glass did 
not give the police the explanation he now proffers—that 
he had no memory of what happened—but relied instead 
on an alibi that he was not even at the scene when the 
killing occurred.”  Id. at 17.  Thus, even considering the 
new psychological evidence, we could not conclude that 
that no rational juror would have voted to convict Glass of 
first-degree murder.   
 As in Glass, the evidence before us on both sides of 
the sanity and mens rea issues is such that we are unable 
to say that no reasonable juror could conclude that Wallace 
was sane and able to form the requisite mens rea to commit 
murder.  Wallace’s purportedly new evidence of actual 
innocence is not so compelling that it undermines our 
confidence in the outcome of his case.   
 In short, Wallace does not satisfy the actual 
innocence standard.   
 C. Evidentiary Hearing and Expert Funds 
Finally, Wallace asks us to consider whether the 






funds.32  In regard to his actual innocence claim, Wallace’s 
reason for requesting an expert is to opine on whether 
Ritalin could have so exacerbated his mental illness as to 
render him insane at the time of the crime.  But as we have 
already discussed, the issue of Wallace’s mental state was 
explored at the time of his pre-trial proceedings and guilty 
plea, and both then and now it is highly debatable.  His 
“new” evidence is only Dr. Cooke’s tentative opinion 
about Ritalin’s possible role: that Ritalin could at most 
provide a “partial defense.”  JA 801.  This tepid evidence 
is hardly strong enough to undermine confidence in the 
criminal proceeding’s outcome, and even if Wallace had 
proffered more powerful expert testimony regarding the 
side effects of Ritalin, the countervailing evidence of 
record is such that he would be unable to show that “no 
reasonable juror” would convict him of murder.   
 
Thus, an expert’s testimony is unnecessary to 
resolve Wallace’s actual innocence claim.  The District 
 
32 Although Wallace’s motion to the District Court was 
limited to funds for an expert, we presume this request 
implicitly included a motion for an evidentiary hearing at 






Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a 
hearing or in declining to order funds to retain an expert. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Wallace filed his habeas petition in 2015, nearly a 
decade and a half after he pleaded guilty to third-degree 
murder.  In order for us to consider his petition on its 
merits, he must establish a basis for us to excuse or extend 
the one-year habeas filing deadline.  Although he argues 
for both an extension of the deadline based on equitable 
tolling and excuse from the deadline due to actual 
innocence, he has not met the standards for either form of 
relief.   
Accordingly, for all the reasons discussed, we will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment dismissing the 
petition on timeliness grounds.33 
 
33 Judge McKee would have ordered a remand, authorized 
funds for an expert, and directed that an evidentiary 
hearing be held on the medical issues pertaining to 
Wallace’s ability to file for habeas relief. 
